Dynamic double auctions: toward first best
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- Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
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Cites work
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- A dominant strategy double auction
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
- Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
- Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7047927 (Why is no real title available?)
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism design
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Probabilistic methods for algorithmic discrete mathematics
- Revenue maximization for market intermediation with correlated priors
- SBBA: a strongly-budget-balanced double-auction mechanism
- Simple and near-optimal mechanisms for market intermediation
- Strategy-proofness in the large
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
Cited in
(11)- Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
- Modeling dynamic sealed-offer \(k\)-double auctions using a mixture of distributions
- Cost sharing in two-sided markets
- Simple and near-optimal mechanisms for market intermediation
- Designing markets for daily deals
- Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6532037 (Why is no real title available?)
- Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
- How efficient are decentralized auction platforms?
- Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
- Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities
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