Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance

DOI10.1137/1.9781611974331.CH98MaRDI QIDQ4575681zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Turchetta, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date 16 July 2018

Published in Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611974331.ch98

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionsincentive compatible mechanismindividually rational mechanismstrongly budget-balanced mechanismunit-demand buyersunit-supply sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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• Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization

Cited in

(26)

• Removal and threshold pricing: truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants
• Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
• Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
• Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Cost sharing in two-sided markets
• SBBA: a strongly-budget-balanced double-auction mechanism
• Revenue maximization for market intermediation with correlated priors
• Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
• Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions
• Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
• Double Auction in Two-Level Markets
• Fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets
• Dynamic double auctions: toward first best
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Algorithms – ESA 2004
• Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets
• Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities
• Improved approximation ratios of fixed-price mechanisms in bilateral trades
• An \(\alpha \)-regret analysis of adversarial bilateral trade
• Efficient two-sided markets with limited information

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