The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
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Publication:2638914
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90147-VzbMath0717.90022OpenAlexW2077744471MaRDI QIDQ2638914
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90147-v
Related Items
Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information ⋮ Bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options ⋮ Bilateral trading with naive traders ⋮ Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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