Maximal matchings

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103254MaRDI QIDQ7303928zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Anh Triêu, Iwan Bos, Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen

Publication date 24 July 2026

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103254

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Welfare economics (91B15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• A dominant strategy double auction
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1947406 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Internet auctions with many traders
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• Optimal Auction Design
• Redistribution through markets
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Böhm-Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis
• The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
• Tracking the invisible hand: convergence of double auctions to competive equilibrium
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

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