Algorithmic mechanism design
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- Distributed games
- Exact and Approximate Algorithms for Scheduling Nonidentical Processors
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226101 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in Teams
- Linear programming without the matrix
- Microeconomic theory
- On the value of information in distributed decision-making (extended abstract)
- The Byzantine Generals Problem
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
- Dynamic mechanism design
- Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
- A parallel machine schedule updating game with compensations and clients averse to uncertain loss
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Algorithms for strategyproof classification
- No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- The complexity of resource allocation and price mechanisms under bounded rationality
- Continuous learning methods in two-buyer pricing problem
- A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
- A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
- Incentive compatible regression learning
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- Strategyproof mechanisms for 2-facility location games with minimax envy
- Tighter price of anarchy for selfish task allocation on selfish machines
- Anarchy in the UJ: coordination mechanisms for minimizing the number of late jobs
- Strategyproof mechanisms for \(2\)-facility location games with minimax envy
- Mechanisms for dual-role-facility location games: truthfulness and approximability
- The capacity constrained facility location problem
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Learning in nonlinear pricing with unknown utility functions
- Computer science and decision theory
- New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines
- On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments
- Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
- Mechanism design for policy routing
- Proving Arrow's theorem by \texttt{PROLOG}
- Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
- Fault tolerant mechanism design
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
- Stackelberg network pricing games
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Exact and approximate truthful mechanisms for the shortest paths tree problem
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- A survey on networking games in telecommunications
- Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location
- The price of anarchy as a classifier for mechanism design in a Pareto-Bayesian-Nash context
- Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
- A unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Computing (and Life) Is All about Tradeoffs
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- A survey on approximation mechanism design without money for facility games
- Synthesis with rational environments
- The price of multi-organization constraint in unrelated parallel machine scheduling
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131735 (Why is no real title available?)
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
- Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Collaboration in Large-Scale Transportation Networks
- The price of matching with metric preferences
- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
- Mechanisms with monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
- Rationality authority for provable rational behavior
- Non-preemptive Coordination Mechanisms for Identical Machine Scheduling Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5309433 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
- Distributed algorithmic mechanism design
- When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures
- Collaboration in Cargo Transportation
- Asynchronous congestion games
- Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines
- Maximizing the minimum load: the cost of selfishness
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Reducing price of anarchy of selfish task allocation with more selfishness
- The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited
- On bilevel machine scheduling problems
- An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1947375 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1962741 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2156280 (Why is no real title available?)
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
- Algorithms as mechanisms: the price of anarchy of relax and round
- Truthful prompt scheduling for minimizing sum of completion times
- Smoothed and average-case approximation ratios of mechanisms: beyond the worst-case analysis
- Appraising two decades of distributed computing theory research
- Mechanism design
- Combinatorial auctions without money
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
- Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
- The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited
- Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
- Incentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agents
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2226165 (Why is no real title available?)
- Automated mechanism design: a new application area for search algorithms
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
- Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
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