The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
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Abstract: We study the problem of scheduling tasks to selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, where the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which myopically allocates each task to its best machine, achieves an approximation ratio of . This improves significantly on the previously best known bound of for prior-independent mechanisms, given by Chawla et al. [STOC'13] under the additional assumption of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions. Although we demonstrate that this is in general tight, if we do maintain the MHR assumption, then we get improved, (small) constant bounds for i.i.d. tasks, while we also identify a sufficient condition on the distribution that yields a constant approximation ratio regardless of the number of tasks.
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Cited in
(7)- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
- Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
- Trust-based mechanisms for robust and efficient task allocation in the presence of execution uncertainty
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
- A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
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