Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973730.130zbMath1372.90044arXiv1405.5940OpenAlexW2952234622MaRDI QIDQ5363020

Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

Publication date: 5 October 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.5940

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

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