The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
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Publication:3460800
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_25zbMath1410.90087arXiv1509.07455MaRDI QIDQ3460800
Maria Kyropoulou, Yiannis Giannakopoulos
Publication date: 8 January 2016
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.07455
62C10: Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures
90B35: Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research
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