Revenue submodularity

DOI10.4086/TOC.2012.V008A002MaRDI QIDQ2913805zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan

Publication date 27 September 2012

Published in Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4086/toc.2012.v008a002

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitysubmodularityrevenueVCGoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(15)

• The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
• Auction timing and market thickness
• Revenue monotonicity under misspecified bidders
• A unifying look at sequence submodularity
• Online BP functions maximization
• A Nearly-Linear Time Algorithm for Submodular Maximization with a Knapsack Constraint
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Matroid rank functions and discrete concavity
• Allocating revenues in a Smart TV ecosystem
• Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
• Towards nearly-linear time algorithms for submodular maximization with a matroid constraint
• A tight linear time (1/2)-approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization
• Online submodular maximization with preemption
• On a modification of the VCG mechanism and its optimality
• A Tight Approximation for Submodular Maximization with Mixed Packing and Covering Constraints

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