Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2009.02.001MaRDI QIDQ1019737zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chang-Yuan Yu

Publication date 28 May 2009

Published in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmschedulingtruthful mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Approximation algorithms (68W25)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1875417 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Algorithms – ESA 2005
• An improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines
• Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
• Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
• Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
• Incentives in Teams
• Mechanism Design for Fractional Scheduling on Unrelated Machines
• Optimal Auction Design
• STACS 2005
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(18)

• Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
• Mechanism Design for Fractional Scheduling on Unrelated Machines
• An improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
• The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
• A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
• Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
• Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
• A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
• No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
• Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines
• Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
• Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines
• A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
• A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
• On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case
• New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines

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