Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1019737
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2009.02.001zbMATH Open1191.68877OpenAlexW2060824497MaRDI QIDQ1019737FDOQ1019737
Authors: Chang-Yuan Yu 
Publication date: 28 May 2009
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.02.001
Recommendations
- An improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines
- New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines
- Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines
- Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines
- A truthful mechanism for interval scheduling
- Truthful Mechanisms for Competitive Reward-Based Scheduling
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
- STACS 2005
- A unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines
Cites Work
- Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentives in Teams
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- STACS 2005
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
- A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
- Mechanism Design for Fractional Scheduling on Unrelated Machines
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- An improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines
- Algorithms – ESA 2005
Cited In (18)
- Mechanism Design for Fractional Scheduling on Unrelated Machines
- An improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
- A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
- Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
- Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
- No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems
- Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines
- Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines
- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
- A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
- A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
- On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines
- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
This page was built for publication: Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1019737)
