Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
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- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
- Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
- A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297764 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- A unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Algorithmic mechanism design
- An improved randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling unrelated machines
- Incentives in Teams
- Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
- Optimal lower bounds for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
- Truthful approximation schemes for single-parameter agents
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Cited in
(7)- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
- Online scheduling of jobs with favorite machines
- No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
- Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling
- A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
- New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines
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