Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234104 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Algorithmic mechanism design
- Algorithms – ESA 2005
- An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem
- Approximation algorithms for NP-hard problems.
- Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- Finding Minimum-Cost Circulations by Successive Approximation
- Incentives in Teams
- Maximal Flow Through a Network
- Mechanism Design for Fractional Scheduling on Unrelated Machines
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
- Optimal Auction Design
- STACS 2004
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
- State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Cited in
(29)- On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case
- Recent developments in the mechanism design problem for scheduling
- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
- A unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
- Cycle monotonicity in scheduling models
- A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture
- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
- Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
- Bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi-criterion approximation algorithms
- Mechanism design
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
- No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems
- Online scheduling of jobs with favorite machines
- Testing the quantal response hypothesis
- Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Mechanisms with monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
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