Incentives and justice for sequencing problems

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0983-2MaRDI QIDQ2403448zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Parikshit De, Manipushpak Mitra

Publication date 8 September 2017

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65447/1/MPRA_paper_65447.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceex-post implementationimplementationjust sequencing ruleoutcome efficient sequencing rulesequencing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

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• Ex post implementation
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(13)

• Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
• On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
• Lorenz optimality for sequencing problems with welfare bounds
• Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
• Recent developments in the queueing problem
• Optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem with two-dimensional types
• Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
• Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
• Mechanism design in fair sequencing
• Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
• Axiomatic and strategic foundations for the pairwise equal splitting rule in sequencing problems with an initial queue
• Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem
• Agent selectiveness and supply-side interventions in waiting lists: performance and comparative statics

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