Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
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Publication:2403448
DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0983-2zbMath1395.91222OpenAlexW1661762994MaRDI QIDQ2403448
Manipushpak Mitra, Parikshit De
Publication date: 8 September 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65447/1/MPRA_paper_65447.pdf
sequencingimplementationbudget balanceex-post implementationjust sequencing ruleoutcome efficient sequencing rule
Related Items
Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
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