Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90148-2zbMath0651.90005MaRDI QIDQ1106709

Matthew O. Jackson, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90148-2

zbMATH Keywords

maximin; protective criterion; social welfare; leximin; game against nature

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion, Conjoint axiomatization of Min, DiscriMin and LexiMin, A prudent characterization of the ranked pairs rule, An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty, A characterization of the prudent order preference function, Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice, Protective and prudent behaviour in games, Protective behavior in matching models, Characterization of Pareto dominance, Decision rules with bounded memory, A trichotomy of attitudes for decision-making under complete ignorance, Characterizing cautious choice

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