Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
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Publication:1939524
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0326-xzbMath1282.90050MaRDI QIDQ1939524
Publication date: 4 March 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0326-x
60K25: Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory)
90B22: Queues and service in operations research
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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