Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0370-zzbMath1190.91079OpenAlexW2170591035MaRDI QIDQ836928

Shigehiro Serizawa, Kentaro Hatsumi

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2008/DP0686-RR-N.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

Cites Work

• Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
• Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
• A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
• More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
• Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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