Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
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Publication:836928
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0370-zzbMath1190.91079MaRDI QIDQ836928
Shigehiro Serizawa, Kentaro Hatsumi
Publication date: 9 September 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2008/DP0686-RR-N.pdf
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods, Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines, Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences, Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money, Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
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