Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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Publication:2432497
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0099-XzbMATH Open1108.91025OpenAlexW2044692536MaRDI QIDQ2432497FDOQ2432497
Authors: Shigehiro Serizawa 
Publication date: 25 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13744
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Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Social choice (91B14) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
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- Manipulation through bribes
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- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
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- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note.
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
Cited In (23)
- Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
- Manipulation through bribes
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
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