Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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Publication:2432497
The aim of this paper is, to weaken group strategy-proofness, which is frequently used in the literature on social choice theory. Therefore a so-called pairwise strategy-proofness is introduced, which does not require, that a social choice rule should be immune to manipulations by more than two agents. This condition is applied to various types of economies. Mathematically the proofs represent a skillfull interplay between properties (continuity, concavity, monotonicity) of preferences (and their associated utility functions) and Pareto efficiency of allocations.
Recommendations
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- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
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Cited in
(26)- Manipulation through bribes
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