Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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Publication:2432497
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation through bribes
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note.
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
Cited in
(24)- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
- Manipulation through bribes
- Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
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