Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
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Publication:1680109
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.11.002zbMATH Open1415.91119OpenAlexW3121969222MaRDI QIDQ1680109FDOQ1680109
Authors: Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/893.pdf
Recommendations
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
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- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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- Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
group strategy-proofnessimmunitynon-manipulabilitycredible deviations from truthpublic good decision
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Voting by Committees
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
Cited In (3)
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