Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
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Publication:1680109
Recommendations
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
- Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
Cites work
- Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
- Voting by Committees
- Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
Cited in
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