Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
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Cites work
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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