Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.08.003zbMath1127.91021MaRDI QIDQ557955

Jun Wako

Publication date: 30 June 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Scarf economy; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Commodity-wise competitive allocation; Indivisible goods; Separable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods, Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods, The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible

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