Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2004.08.003MaRDI QIDQ557955zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jun Wako

Publication date 30 June 2005

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition-proof Nash equilibriumCommodity-wise competitive allocationIndivisible goodsSeparable preferencesShapley-Scarf economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784404 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(10)

• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
• Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784404 (Why is no real title available?)
• Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
• Barter markets, indivisibilities, and Markovian core
• Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
• Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles

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