Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105197MaRDI QIDQ2025006zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vikram Manjunath, Alexander Westkamp

Publication date 11 May 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105197

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityindivisible goodsmulti-unit demandPareto-efficiencystrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
• Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
• Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods
• Centralized allocation in multiple markets
• Dual-donor organ exchange
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the operation of multiple matching markets
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Pairwise kidney exchange: comment
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(16)

• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
• Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
• Mechanisms for trading durable goods
• A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
• Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
• A parallel approach with the strategy-proof mechanism for large-scale group decision making: an application in industrial Internet
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
• On Pareto optimal balanced exchanges
• Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
• Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences
• A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
• Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
• Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
• Computing balanced solutions for large international kidney exchange schemes when cycle length is unbounded
• Assigning tasks to pairs

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