Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
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Publication:2025006
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105197zbMath1461.91155OpenAlexW3123226570MaRDI QIDQ2025006
Alexander Westkamp, Vikram Manjunath
Publication date: 11 May 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105197
Related Items (5)
Mechanisms for trading durable goods ⋮ Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ A parallel approach with the strategy-proof mechanism for large-scale group decision making: an application in industrial Internet ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
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