The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
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Publication:449183
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.05.017zbMATH Open1247.91101OpenAlexW3124898266MaRDI QIDQ449183FDOQ449183
Authors: Paula Jaramillo, Vikram Manjunath 
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017
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house allocationstrategy-proofnessexisting tenantshousing marketindivisible goodstop trading cyclesindifference
Cites Work
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- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Strong Core and Competitive Equilibria of an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods
- On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
Cited In (33)
- Top trading cycles
- Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
- Stability of an allocation of objects
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
- Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
- Non-bossiness
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
- Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Mechanisms for trading durable goods
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
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