The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
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Publication:449183
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017zbMath1247.91101OpenAlexW3124898266MaRDI QIDQ449183
Vikram Manjunath, Paula Jaramillo
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017
strategy-proofnesshouse allocationexisting tenantshousing marketindivisible goodstop trading cyclesindifference
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