Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102625MaRDI QIDQ2138369zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jingsheng Yu, Jun Zhang

Publication date 11 May 2022

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102625

zbMATH Keywords

corehousing market modelrestricted endowment rightstop trading cycle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A market design approach to job rotation
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(23)

• A capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences
• The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
• Top trading cycles
• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
• Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
• Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
• ON TWO THEOREMS OF QUINZII AND RENT CONTROLLED HOUSING ALLOCATION IN SWEDEN
• An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
• Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy
• Endowments, exclusion, and exchange
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
• The core for housing markets with limited externalities
• Shapley-Scarf housing markets: respecting improvement, integer programming, and kidney exchange
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• Matching with restricted trade
• The Market for Residential Architecture: 19th Century Row Houses in Boston′s South End

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