Matching with restricted trade
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Publication:2329419
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Cites work
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- On cores and indivisibility
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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