An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108905MaRDI QIDQ2300346zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Lijun Pan, Yu Zhou, Linyu Peng

Publication date 27 February 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108905

zbMATH Keywords

ascending auctionassignment modelcompetitive equilibriumexistencelatticelocal constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
• Matching with restricted trade
• Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• The assignment game. I: The core

Cited in

(5)

• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488125 (Why is no real title available?)
• Assignment models for constrained marginals and restricted markets
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game

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