A market design approach to job rotation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.01.002zbMATH Open1437.91257OpenAlexW2999073069WikidataQ126330575 ScholiaQ126330575MaRDI QIDQ2178013FDOQ2178013

Jun Zhang, Jingsheng Yu

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessconstrained efficiencyjob rotationbackward-induction top trading cyclecoarse priority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On cores and indivisibility
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities

Cited In (6)

• Job rotation using the multi-period assignment model
• On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
• A methodology to create robust job rotation schedules
• Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
• Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
• On two mechanisms in job rotation problems

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