Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3163858 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- Self-selection consistent functions
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- \textit{In Silico} voting experiments
Cited in
(16)- Self-selective social choice functions
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Manipulability of choice aggregations
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 726886 (Why is no real title available?)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
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