A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0888-1zbMath1341.91068OpenAlexW1978330051MaRDI QIDQ904839

Mridu Prabal Goswami, Sonal Yadav, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0888-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
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• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
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