A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production
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Publication:904839
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0888-1zbMath1341.91068OpenAlexW1978330051MaRDI QIDQ904839
Mridu Prabal Goswami, Sonal Yadav, Arunava Sen
Publication date: 14 January 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0888-1
Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14)
Cites Work
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