A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0888-1MaRDI QIDQ904839zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mridu Prabal Goswami, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav

Publication date 14 January 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0888-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
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Cites work

• Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
• Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3539473 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
• On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note.
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies

Cited in

(1)

• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies

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