Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
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Publication:1751281
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.05.055zbMath1394.91180OpenAlexW2416284695MaRDI QIDQ1751281
Publication date: 24 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.05.055
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Cites Work
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