On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments

DOI10.1007/s00224-018-9898-6zbMath1422.91141arXiv1707.00230OpenAlexW3099823252WikidataQ128890387 ScholiaQ128890387MaRDI QIDQ2322707

Warut Suksompong

Publication date: 5 September 2019

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.00230

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsocial welfareblack-box transformationdownward-closed

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
• On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design
• Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
• Algorithmic mechanism design

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