Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
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Publication:3162522
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_21zbMath1310.91071arXiv1007.3539MaRDI QIDQ3162522
Lei Wang, Gagan Goel, C. Karande
Publication date: 19 October 2010
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.3539
68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Price of fairness for allocating a bounded resource, On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments, Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design, Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
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