Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13MaRDI QIDQ3460787zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Liad Blumrosen, Osnat Zohar

Publication date 8 January 2016

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13

zbMATH Keywords

deferred-acceptance auctionsmultilateral marketssupply chains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance

Cites work

• A dominant strategy double auction
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(4)

• Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
• Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems
• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets

This page was built for publication: Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3460787)