The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00355MaRDI QIDQ5475010zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven R. Williams, Mark Allen Satterthwaite

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1256.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(42)

• Simple market protocols for efficient risk sharing
• The optimal design of a market
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Smart market mechanisms: From practice to theory
• The effectiveness of English auctions.
• The limit-price mechanism.
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• The extent of the market and optimal specialization
• Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
• Price discovery using a double auction
• Market inefficiency, entry order and coordination
• Optimal market thickness
• Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
• A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• A double auction based mathematical market model and heuristics for Internet-based secondhand durable good markets
• Entry-deterring agency
• Efficient dark markets
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
• Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
• Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
• THE ALLOCATION OF SURPLUS BY MARKETS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
• Augmenting markets with mechanisms
• The exposure problem and market design
• Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
• Which Market Protocols Facilitate Fair Trading?
• Algorithms – ESA 2004
• On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
• Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
• Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms
• Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
• Efficient two-sided markets with limited information
• The matching benefits of market thickness
• Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
• Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
• A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
• Structure, clearinghouses and symmetry
• Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
• The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values

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