Recommendations
Cites work
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Game theory
- Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- The tight constant in the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality
- Why banks should keep secrets
Cited in
(7)- Limelight on dark markets: theory and experimental evidence on liquidity and information
- Endogenous formation of security exchanges
- Publicly verifiable and secrecy preserving periodic auctions
- Augmenting markets with mechanisms
- Forbidden Transactions and Black Markets
- Kicking-the-bucket: fast privacy-preserving trading using buckets
- Verifiable disclosure
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