Efficient dark markets

DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0851-xzbMath1356.91053OpenAlexW1985486650MaRDI QIDQ2354548

Romans Pancs

Publication date: 20 July 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0851-x

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencyinformation disclosuredark markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Endogenous formation of security exchanges ⋮ Verifiable disclosure

Cites Work

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