Verifiable disclosure

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1048-xzbMath1403.91230OpenAlexW3193212962MaRDI QIDQ722620

Jeremy Bertomeu, Davide Cianciaruso

Publication date: 27 July 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1048-x

zbMATH Keywords

verificationunravelingdisclosuresanitationtruthfuluncertain information endowment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Informational correlation and selective disclosure ⋮ Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games ⋮ Full revelation under optional verification ⋮ Disclosure with unknown expertise ⋮ Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions

Cites Work

• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Welfare reducing polls
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Efficient dark markets
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Why banks should keep secrets
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility
• Disclosures and Asset Returns

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