Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105653zbMath1520.91073OpenAlexW4365517454MaRDI QIDQ6166480

Unnamed Author, Avi Lichtig

Publication date: 6 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105653

zbMATH Keywords

evidenceinformativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Verifiable disclosure
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Disclosure and Choice
• Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

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