Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105653zbMATH Open1520.91073OpenAlexW4365517454MaRDI QIDQ6166480FDOQ6166480

Authors: Avi Lichtig 

Publication date: 6 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105653

Recommendations

• Verifiable disclosure
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• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
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• Communication with evidence in the lab

zbMATH Keywords

evidenceinformativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Disclosure and choice
• Verifiable disclosure
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness

Cited In (11)

• Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
• STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN A STYLIZED (SO-CALLED CHINOS) GUESSING GAME
• Communication with evidence in the lab
• Disclosure with unknown expertise
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
• Information acquisition and the value of bad news
• Full disclosure in decentralized organizations
• Informational correlation and selective disclosure
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• A two-person game of information transmission

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