Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.013OpenAlexW4309022953MaRDI QIDQ2681501

Leslie M. Marx, Simon Loertscher

Publication date: 3 February 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.013

zbMATH Keywords

market mechanismLaffer curvedetail freeendogenous trading positionmechanism design with estimation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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