Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
From MaRDI portal
Publication:932804
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.014zbMath1142.91496OpenAlexW2133284458WikidataQ56852501 ScholiaQ56852501MaRDI QIDQ932804
Artyom A. Shneyerov, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 11 July 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.014
Related Items (13)
Foundation of competitive equilibrium with non-transferable utility ⋮ FOR-PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS ⋮ Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model ⋮ The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms ⋮ The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency? ⋮ Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information ⋮ Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions ⋮ Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium ⋮ Entry-deterring agency ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Internet auctions with many traders
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- Attention economies
- Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
- Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
This page was built for publication: Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
