A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model
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Publication:485616
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.005zbMath1302.91099OpenAlexW1966201446MaRDI QIDQ485616
Publication date: 12 January 2015
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.005
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
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Cites Work
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Bargaining in dynamic markets
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- A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
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