Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
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- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- Convergence in incomplete market models
- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market
- Bilateral trading with incomplete information and price convergence in a small market: the continuous support case
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
- Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- Price discovery using a double auction
- Market inefficiency, entry order and coordination
- Optimal market thickness
- Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
- On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
- Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets
- A double auction based mathematical market model and heuristics for Internet-based secondhand durable good markets
- Entry-deterring agency
- Tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets
- Constrained efficiency versus unanimity in incomplete markets
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
- Modularity and greed in double auctions
- Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
- The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
- The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Efficiency of antiquarian bookshops in informationally complete markets
- Price inference in small markets
- Markets are efficient if and only if P = NP
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
- Approximating the equilibrium quantity traded and welfare in large markets
- Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
- Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
- On the Convergence to Homogeneous Expectations when Markets are Complete
- Net trade and market efficiency in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
- Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply
- Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
- Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
- Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer's bid double auction
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- Informed agent's advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information
- Efficient two-sided markets with limited information
- The matching benefits of market thickness
- Robust auctions with affiliated private values
- Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations
- Quadratic funding with incomplete information
- Information disclosure by informed intermediary in double auction
- Stochastic stability in a double auction
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Multidimensional screening with precise seller information
- Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Internet auctions with many traders
- Information and strategic behavior
- Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game
- Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- An ascending double auction
- The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
- Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
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