Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAD116MaRDI QIDQ7008422zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Paulo Barelli, Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Publication date 21 March 2025

Published in The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDAD116

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsdouble auctionsequilibriainformation aggregationrational expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Efficient Auctions
• Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Information aggregation in competitive markets
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Repeated Games
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium

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