Competitive limit of competing auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.03.015MaRDI QIDQ7297081zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zizhen Ma, Nicolás Riquelme

Publication date 15 July 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.03.015

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Competition among auctioneers in large markets
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Efficient competition through cheap talk: the case of competing auctions
• Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
• On the existence of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria
• Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations
• The tight constant in the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. I: Mixed strategies
• Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. II: Pure strategies

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