Efficient competition through cheap talk: the case of competing auctions

DOI10.3982/ECTA12103MaRDI QIDQ4614306zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philipp Kircher, Kyung Min Kim

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12103

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkcompeting auctionsdirected search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(13)

• Frictional capital reallocation. I: Ex ante heterogeneity
• A theory of production, matching, and distribution
• Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: an argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination
• Efficiency in search and matching models: a generalized hosios condition
• Competitive search with ex-post opportunism
• Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
• Seller cheap talk in almost common value auction
• Customer relationship and sales
• Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
• Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
• Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion
• Wages as signals of worker mobility
• Affiliated common value auctions with costly entry

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