Efficient Competition Through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions

DOI10.3982/ECTA12103zbMath1419.91331OpenAlexW1913058305MaRDI QIDQ4614306

Philipp Kircher, Kyung Min Kim

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12103

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkdirected searchcompeting auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (9)

Customer relationship and sales ⋮ Frictional capital reallocation. I: Ex ante heterogeneity ⋮ A theory of production, matching, and distribution ⋮ Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion ⋮ Wages as signals of worker mobility ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets ⋮ Efficiency in search and matching models: a generalized hosios condition ⋮ Competitive search with ex-post opportunism

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