Asymmetric English auctions.
The paper deals with the \(n\)-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auctions in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. The main purpose is to obtain conditions ensuring the existence of an efficient ex post equilibrium in which for every realization of the signals the object is obtained by the bidder with the highest value. Two extensions of so-called the single crossing condition [\textit{E. Maskin}, Auctions and privatization. In: H. Siebert (ed.), Privatization, Institut für Weltwirtschaften der Universität Kiel, Kiel, 1992, 115--136 (1992)] are derived. Each condition is separately sufficient to guarantee that there is an efficient equilibrium. Both involve a strengthening of the single crossing condition.
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An Efficient Auction
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
- On the efficiency of the first price auction
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
- Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Buy-price English auction
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
- Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
- Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
- The insider's curse
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- An ascending double auction
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