Asymmetric English auctions.
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Cites work
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An Efficient Auction
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
Cited in
(25)- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
- On the efficiency of the first price auction
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
- Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Buy-price English auction
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
- Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
- Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
- The insider's curse
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- An ascending double auction
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