Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105029MaRDI QIDQ2173110zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jinwoo Kim, Youngwoo Koh

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ier.snu.ac.kr/activity/working-papers?md=download&seqidx=13

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency/revenue trade-offfirst-price auctioninterdependent valueslearning rival's informationsecond-price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
• Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
• Auctions with flexible information acquisition
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions

Cites work

• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Collusion and delegation under information control
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions

Cited in

(3)

• Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
• The role of information in auctions
• The value to a firm of its rival learning

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