Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation

DOI10.7916/D86T0ZVZMaRDI QIDQ3418481zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim

Publication date 5 February 2007

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchical delegationrobustly collusion-proof implementation, pairwise identifiabilitysubgroup collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
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• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
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Cited in

(34)

• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
• Decentralization and collusion
• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
• Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
• Self-rejecting mechanisms
• Consulting collusive experts
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Optimal collusion with internal contracting
• Bidding collusion without passive updating
• Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
• Reauditing and dual sourcing? Implication of collusion deterrence measures in ethical sourcing
• Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
• Secret versus public rings in common value auctions
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers

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