Decentralization and collusion

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2462MaRDI QIDQ1277089zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström

Publication date 16 June 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1210.pdf, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221566

zbMATH Keywords

decentralizationdistribution of surplusmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

Cited in

(23)

• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting
• Divide and conquer: the engineering of delegation
• Consulting collusive experts
• Transshipment incentive contracts in a multi-level supply chain
• The optimality of team contracts
• Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy
• Salience bias and overwork
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2089339 (Why is no real title available?)
• Project assignment rights and incentives for eliciting ideas
• Monitoring gains and decentralization
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collusion and delegation under information control
• Technical change and the decentralization penalty
• Conflict and Development
• The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation.
• Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war
• Collusion, shading, and optimal organization design
• Task scheduling and moral hazard

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