Technical change and the decentralization penalty

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_2zbMATH Open1443.91185OpenAlexW2947017015MaRDI QIDQ5111101FDOQ5111101

Authors: Thomas Marschak, Dong Wei 

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_2

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zbMATH Keywords

firmtechnology improvementdecentralized/centralized arrangement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• A First Course in Optimization Theory
• Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
• Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
• Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games

Cited In (4)

• Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm
• Information technology and government decentralization: experimental evidence from Paraguay
• Biased technical change and parallel neutrality
• When does centralization undermine adaptation?

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