An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 597904 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An Efficient Auction
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Regression Analysis when the Dependent Variable Is Truncated Normal
- Tobit models: A survey
Cited in
(12)- Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence
- Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- When and why not to auction
- On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- On efficiency of the English auction
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