Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
- An Efficient Auction
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
- Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Optimal Auction Design
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
Cited in
(5)
This page was built for publication: Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q405757)
